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1. The Problem: Protecting Public Values in Systems of Private Rights
In the American West, as in most societies of the world, water is a public resource
of which private uses are allowed according to rules designed to protect and enhance
broad public values. Not everyone would agree on the definition of “public values,” but
they generally attach to services that water provides that are important to large numbers
of people in society, and they often are difficult to quantify in monetary terms. A few
examples illustrate the diverse services provided by water in the arid and semi-arid
American West: preservation of biological diversity in healthy, functioning aquatic
ecosystems; opportunities for aesthetic appreciation and spiritual renewal; recreational
activities such as fishing, boating, swimming, bird watching, hiking, and scenic driving;
cultural identity and historical activities related to streams and lakes; and concerns for
future economic opportunities dependent on reliable water supplies. Some of these
services result in commercially valuable activities and industries; others lack easily
measured monetary value but nonetheless support the economic well-being of society.
Since the first non-Native people came to the United States, the task of water law
has been to allocate water to individuals and enterprises for utilitarian purposes and thus
further a broad public interest in economic expansion. Until it was so allocated, water
remained a public resource. Private uses allowed by law, however, could come into
conflict with public uses. For example, occasionally the public’s right to use waterways
for boating came into conflict with uses that obstructed or depleted the flow of streams,
or water contamination impaired domestic water uses. Only in recent years has the law
recognized that the rights of the public can be strong enough to trump individual
economic uses.
Two phenomena have combined to create a greater consciousness of the public’s
interest: (1) scarcity of water sources; and (2) an increased understanding of the
interconnection of forms of life (including human life) that are dependent on ecosystem
health. Scarcity of water in the United States results in part from a growth in urban
demand and in part from the demand for free-flowing streams to sustain ecosystems and
for human recreational uses. Because most useful sites for major water projects have
been developed or are off-limits for environmental reasons, the old response to water
problems – developing new sources with structural projects – is no longer viable.
Most states’ water laws included nominal protections for the public interest, but
historically these public rights had little significant impact on utilitarian purposes.
Recently, however, state and federal laws have given more substantial, if uneven,
protection to the public interest. Today, there are many legal mechanisms for protecting
the public interest. Some are imposed at the point when waters are appropriated or when
an existing use is changed. Some apply when a dam or other major structure is built.
Federal environmental laws have proven the strongest mechanisms for asserting and
protecting diverse public interests.
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In this section we examine the roots of competition between public and private
rights. In section II, we examine the means that have been adopted by state and federal
legislatures and, in some cases, by courts to ensure that public interests are protected,
with a particular emphasis on environmental protection. Section III focuses on Indian
water rights, which raise legal and equity issues similar to public interest concerns but are
administered in a unique legal framework with a different set of problems.

A. State Laws Create “Rights” That Allow Use Of Water For Private Gain
Water law developed differently in the eastern and western parts of the United
States. In the East, landowners along streams and adjacent to lakes held “riparian rights”
to the waters for the benefit of their lands. Although “pure” statements of the law said
that the landowner’s right was to the full flow of the stream, undiminished in quantity and
quality, the law virtually always allowed water to be diverted from the stream by other
riparian landowners for uses on their lands. The riparian doctrine envisions water users
on a particular watercourse sharing the water equitably, as expressed in the “reasonable
use” rule. In the West, by contrast, rights to use water were based on “prior
appropriation” – the idea that the first person to put water to use should have a right to
continue that use regardless of subsequent diversions by others, upstream or downstream.
The prior appropriation doctrine explicitly allows an appropriator to put water to use far
from the stream of origin—even in another watershed.
These contrasting approaches reflect differences in the availability of water in the
two regions as well as historical differences in land ownership and use. The West is drier
than the East, and the availability of water varies tremendously seasonally and
geographically. Thus, public policies developed in the middle of the nineteenth century
aimed at providing basic human necessities and favored the productive use of water by
permitting citizens to establish private rights and to protect their uses under the law. In
those days the land was almost entirely federal property or “public land” but the federal
government did not dictate the manner of allocating water rights. Indeed, it allowed
states to create their own systems of assigning rights to use water located on government
land.
In this way, the government encouraged investments in irrigation systems to serve
lands granted to private parties by the government and investments for mines located on
public lands. Like a subsidy, giving private parties free rights to use water created an
incentive to economic activity that was considered necessary to accomplish regional and
national goals of expansion and growth. This was consistent with the government’s
desire to promote western expansion and with local economic development efforts.
Given the settlement patterns in this region, other departures from eastern water
law were necessary. For example, an appropriator did not need to be a landowner
inasmuch as most of the land in the West in the nineteenth century was the property of
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the federal government until it was patented (transferred) to homesteaders, miners, states,
or railroads under various government programs. Rights could be lost, however, if the
holder of the rights discontinued the beneficial use.
Today, rights in both eastern and western states are managed largely under permit
systems, with administrative agencies issuing permits and administering water use
according to rules most of which have been codified. Not every state has a permit
system; Colorado, for instance uses courts in place of administrative agencies. There are
also marked differences among state programs. But rights to use water – even under
administrative permit systems – are generally considered a form of property.
The property in water use is novel in two ways. First, it is not a possessory right
like rights to real or personal property that allow the owner to exclude others from access
to or use of land or personality. Second, under Anglo-American law (as under the legal
systems of many cultures) water is considered a public resource in which all members of
society have an interest. Yet, as described above, the law provides means for private
entities to hold property rights in use of the resource – “usufructuary rights.” Most courts
and commentators have said that these private rights must be created and exercised in
ways that are consistent with the public’s interests.
One attribute of the special kind of property right in water is that most systems
have allowed the rights to be transferred. The West’s prior appropriation system did not
restrict water rights to use on a specific plot of land or to a specific type of use. Instead,
water rights could be transferred by one user to another and water could be used
wherever technology and economics would let it be moved. Thus, as the region’s
economies matured, its water rights system could adapt to satisfy growing and competing
demands. Even in the East, where water rights were ostensibly attached to specific land,
exceptions were made by courts to allow water use on non-riparian lands in order to
satisfy economic and social demands.
An appropriator’s capacity to transfer a water right — that is, to transfer legal
priority to use a quantity of water for a beneficial purpose — is a fundamental element of
the “property” that the law recognizes in water use. The transfer of water rights is subject
to the condition that a change of use should not damage the water rights of any other
water user. This rule of “no injury” is the only universal restriction against water
transfers. Initially some states also limited transfers with other restrictions, but those
restrictions have largely fallen with the need to move water from agricultural to urban
uses. Meanwhile, legislatures have imposed other restrictions that were considered
necessary to protect the public interest.
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B. Public Interests and Values
When water is allocated, developed, or transferred, interests of the public are
often affected. Almost any new or changed use of water has some effect on interests or
values of the public, potentially depriving existing users of quantities of water, changing
the flow of streams, or affecting water quality. The effects include:
•

Environmental impacts, including reduced streamflows, loss of wetlands,
damaged ecological systems including fish, wildlife, and riparian vegetation, and
diminished water quality;

•

Harm to other public values that are difficult to quantify, such as aesthetics and
loss of recreational opportunities;

•

Economic and social effects including the loss of income, employment, and
business opportunities.

Even pumping groundwater can have adverse effects where there is a connection
between surface water and groundwater. Extraction of groundwater can alter surface
flow with potentially adverse effects on vegetation and riparian habitat. The impacts are
most frequently realized in the American West today as agricultural water rights are
converted to urban uses. Drying up formerly irrigated lands can lead to soil erosion and
blowing dust and the invasion of noxious weeds.
Historically, the emphasis on encouraging private investment and settlement in
the West meant that these impacts received little consideration and no means of legal
protection. The “pure” prior appropriation doctrine required that water be physically
removed from a stream and put to a recognized beneficial use in order to claim a legally
protected water right. Thus, those who enjoyed the instream benefits of water—
recreational boaters, anglers, resort owners depending on scenic vistas, for example—
could not claim a water right to assert their interests against those coming later to divert
water from the stream. Similarly, courts and administrative agencies did not aggressively
assert broader public interests in water in years in which early water users established the
most senior water rights. The following section examines the tools available for such
protection as well as new approaches developed in recent years.

2. Public Interest Protection
Generally, three types of activity affect the public’s interest in streams: (1)
diversions that deplete streamflows; (2) structures such as dams that obstruct streams and
change flow patterns and temperatures; and (3) discharges that pollute waterways. The
first type of activity falls within an ambit that has been governed by state law. The other
two are largely regulated by federal law. Because of a tradition in the United States of
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allowing states to allocate quantities of water according to their own laws, the federal
government’s environmental protection programs have raised federalism issues. As a
legal matter, the federal government has ample power to preempt state laws, but there is
political resistance to national legislation and administrative actions that conflict with
state water laws. Although state laws recognize water as a public resource, states have
done little to protect the public’s interest.
This failure cannot be attributed to lack of legal authority. The earliest state
legislation or constitutional provisions asserted that grants of private rights in water must
be consistent with the public interest or public welfare. Other laws were more specific in
preserving particular social or economic interests, especially agriculture. For instance,
some laws said that agricultural uses should be protected and speculation should be
prevented in water. Some state laws made water rights appurtenant to specific lands and
flatly prohibited their transfer.
Most water rights systems attempt to limit or prevent adverse impacts on the
public from water uses at the time new users obtain permits. This type of protection,
however, is neither universal nor even among different states or adequate in most states.
Processes limited to water rights holders exclude individuals and other entities that
experience economic, environmental, and social impacts from water use and development
but are not legally recognized water users. There is pressure in most jurisdictions to
include all such affected interests in the process of determining whether the public
interest is served by a proposed water decision. This is the primary means for dealing
with the public interest in state water laws.
Some states have laws regulating transfers away from a watershed or locale that
are intended to protect the area of origin. Local governments, Indian tribes, and rural
communities in the area where water originates frequently suffer the greatest effects
when water decisions benefit more populous areas or interests with greater political or
economic power. For example, water removed from nearby water sources and used
elsewhere may inhibit the future development of local communities. Water taken out of
existing agriculture and transferred elsewhere may reduce agricultural employment in the
area and impact agriculture-related businesses. For their part, municipalities that are
required by law to maintain a certain water quality may find that reduced streamflow will
increase their costs of treating sewage because it is more difficult to dissolve the
discharged waste to meet water quality standards. As tax bases decline and local
businesses suffer there is a resulting decline in the ability of the local government to
provide services to citizens. The area, in turn, becomes less attractive to new businesses.
Social impacts of water allocation, development, and transfer include changes in
community structure, cohesiveness, and control of natural resources.
Public interest concerns are often addressed indirectly through state laws creating
programs to protect instream flows. In addition, strong federal laws protecting
endangered species, water quality, and wetlands provide additional support for the public
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interest. Laws that attempt to protect the public’s interest in water must address how to
represent values other than those of water rights holders. Public agencies usually receive
comments from parties directly involved in decisions concerning the allocation,
development, and transfer of water rights. Sometimes members of the public also can
comment; unless individuals have water rights, however, they are “third parties” to the
transaction and historically they lacked a voice in the process. Modern laws have begun
to include various interests who were affected by the allocation of water rights or other
decisions concerning water use in decision-making processes.
Opportunities to protect the public interest arise in the water decision-making
process when water is allocated to new uses, new projects are proposed, and when water
uses are changed or transferred. The discussion below describes several methods to
integrate public values and assesses their effectiveness. We conclude that there is
considerable potential for the programs now in use in the United States but that they now
provide incomplete protection for the interests of the public.

A. Public Interest Review
State laws often stipulate that water allocation must be consistent with the “public
interest” or “public welfare.” In practice, states rarely deny new uses or transfers in order
to protect the public interest, but instead impose additional conditions on the
appropriation or transfer. Some state laws specifically protect an area of origin from
movement of water to another area or watershed. In the absence of statutory protection
for the public interest courts have invoked the “public trust doctrine” to review existing
water allocations. A few examples illustrate the diversity of states’ public interest
review.
State law requires Idaho’s Department of Water Resources director to determine
whether a proposed water use is in conflict with “the local public interest,” but the statute
does not define this standard (Idaho Statutes, sec. 42-203A). Therefore, the Idaho
Supreme Court has read the statute with reference to other laws of Idaho and of other
states that define the public interest (Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (1985)). Following
that ruling, the Director of Water Resources has convened hearings aimed at reaching
decisions that ensure “the greatest benefit possible to the public [from public waters] for
the public” (Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d at 448 (citing Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15
N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910)). Affected citizens can present evidence about
matters such as aesthetics, recreation, fish, and ecosystem functions that will be impacted
by the proposed water decision. The agency considers not only benefits to the applicant
but also economic effects, alternative uses, minimum stream flows, wastewater, and
conservation.
Not all states apply the same public interest requirements to changes of use or
transfers that they impose on new appropriations. The Supreme Court of Utah, however,
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upheld the application of the same criteria to changes in use that it applies to new
appropriations (Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (1989)). In Nevada, a statute requires
the state to reject an application for a water transfer that would result in damaging the
public interest (Nevada Revised Statute, sec. 533.370(3)). Wyoming, one of the few
states with a special process to evaluate transfers, considers potential economic losses to
the community relative to the benefits of the transfer and the availability of other sources
of water (Wyoming Statutes Annotated, sec. 41-4-503). California, through the State
Water Resources Control Board, reviews proposed transfers to determine if they would
cause an unreasonable effect on the economy in the area of origin or on fish, wildlife, or
other water uses (California Water Code, sec. 109).
Although almost every state in the West, except one Colorado, uses some type of
process to review the public interest in water decisions, all could improve the way in
which they review the effects. The majority of the states lack clear standards to define
the public interest that they are trying to protect. Many of the social, economic, and
ecological interests affected by water allocation, transfer, and use are simply not included
in the considerations of state agencies. If the elements constituting the public interest
were comprehensively articulated, government employees could use them as a guide for
state policy in resolving conflicts among competing interests and to understand better the
tradeoffs inherent in any water decision. Comprehensive water planning is another way
to articulate both the elements of the public interest and state policies related to them.

B. Area of Origin Protection Laws
The prior appropriation doctrine historically did not limit where water was used.
A few states have enacted special laws to limit water transfers from one watershed to
another. These “area-of-origin protection laws” provide a specific type of public interest
review that focuses on the area where water originates. Such restrictions apply to new
appropriations as well as to transfers of existing rights.
California’s population distribution depends on removing huge quantities of water
from sparsely populated areas with copious water to growing cities where water demand
is high. On paper, the legal protections for areas of origin in California are strong. For
example, one state law gives an exporting area an absolute priority to the future use of the
water over the priority of the importing area (California Water Code, sec. 10505).
Another law reserves to the county of origin all of the water necessary for its future
development (California Water Code, sec. 10505.5). As a practical matter, however, it
would be difficult for an area or county of origin to stop exporting water and to cut off an
urban area that has grown dependent on it. Montana has a law that requires participation
of the state in transfers of water out of a watershed; large transfers are limited and the
state is obliged to consider public interest factors (Montana Code Annotated, sec. 85-2402(5)). An Arizona law gives irrigation districts a veto over exports of water beyond
their boundaries (Arizona Revised Statutes, sec. 45-172(5)).
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Colorado allows conservation districts to make transbasin diversions from the
watershed of the Colorado River only if they will not inhibit or increase in cost the
present or future water supply for the exporting area (Colorado Revised Statutes
Annotated, sec. 37-45-118(1)(b)(II)). The law is interpreted to require districts that
import water to the eastern side of the Rocky Mountains to construct special reservoirs
for “compensatory storage” in the watershed of the Colorado River (Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District, 610 P.2d 81, 84 (Colo. 1979)). There are no similar restrictions
against large cities such as Denver that import the majority of the water from distant
watersheds in Colorado.
State restrictions designed specifically to inhibit transfers of water beyond state
borders raise constitutional problems. The United States Supreme Court has decreed that
water is essentially an “article of commerce,” and restrictions that discriminate against
interstate commerce violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
(Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54 (1982)). To be constitutional, the
regulation of water use must be impartial, treating equally users of water within and
without the state.

C. Public Trust Doctrine
The examples described above require public interest review before a new water
use or changed water use is approved. In some instances, however, courts have held that
a state’s decision to permit private use of public resources can be voided when water
rights are allocated or transferred without review of the public interest (National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); In re Water Use Permit
Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Hawaii 2000)). The public trust doctrine recognizes that water
is fundamentally a public resource and that private interests in it should be advanced
without inhibiting the public benefits of using it. As applied, the doctrine allows a court
to reexamine established water rights in order to ensure that public values are protected,
including the public value of environmental protection. The doctrine has its origins in
civil and common law principles that recognize that recognize the public servitude such
as the right of passage over navigable waters and the states property rights in the beds of
navigable waters.
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D. Instream Flow Maintenance Programs
In recent years almost all the western states have passed laws protecting instream
flows. These states either appropriate water rights to themselves that are used to maintain
streamflow levels or they remove from appropriation by private parties the amount of
water that is necessary to maintain desired flows. At present, only Arizona and Alaska
permit individuals and private organizations to appropriate waters for instream flows. In
all other states only a state agency can hold the right.
Statutory programs to protect streamflows are criticized for being ineffective
because typically by the time a state appropriates rights for instream flows, the water in
the stream has already been fully appropriated by others. Therefore, the state’s new
instream flow appropriations are so junior in time that it is possible for senior rights to
dry up the stream most of the time.
Some states, however, permit the state to buy or accept donations of senior water
rights with priorities sufficient to maintain streamflows all or most of the time.
Ultimately, effective protection of the streamflows will depend on the acquisition of
senior water rights in most western streams. Private groups in some states have formed
“water trusts” to finance purchases of senior water rights; these rights must be transferred
to the state agency authorized to hold instream flow rights unless the state allows private
entities to hold them.
Instream flow protection laws do not always protect all of the public uses for
which flowing water is needed. The Colorado statute permits appropriations of a quantity
of water sufficient “to protect the natural environment to a reasonable degree” (Colorado
Revised Statutes Annotated, sec. 37-92-102(3)). The state board that holds the rights has
interpreted this language narrowly and has used it almost entirely to protect cold-water
fish such as trout. Thus, the law is unavailable to protect water quality, riparian
vegetation, wetlands, or recreation.

E. Reserved Rights for Federal Public Lands
In much of the West, large expanses of land are owned by the federal government
and managed for multiple public values. The government has reserved some of these
lands for specific public purposes that require water: national forests, wildlife refuges,
recreation areas, wilderness areas, and military bases. Although military bases require
water for traditional consumptive uses, many of the other land designations may require
water for instream flow uses.
The doctrine of federal reserved water rights says that the federal government,
when setting aside lands for public purposes that require water, impliedly reserved rights
water sufficient to fulfill those purposes (Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)).
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This is a court-made doctrine that traces to precedents dealing with the establishment of
Indian reservations and its development is discussed below in Part III (Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)). In the context of federal public lands, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court has read the doctrine restrictively to limit rights to the minimum amount
of water necessary to accomplish the explicitly articulated federal purposes of each
reservation (Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976)). It has also construed
legislation creating federal reservations narrowly. For instance, national forests do not
have reserved water rights for the instream flows needed for fish and wildlife because
they were created primarily to provide a supply of timber (United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696 (1978)). In any event, the U.S. government has rarely taken action to
enforce reserved rights, even where it has been found to have such rights.

F. Environmental Regulation
Environmental laws that deal with the protection of water quality, wetlands, and
endangered species indirectly deal with the effects of water allocation, development, use,
and transfer. Nearly all these laws are federal and therefore federalism concerns arise
when they conflict with or curtail the uses of water under state water rights. With the
exception of state statutes required to implement federal programs, state environmental
laws are generally not very strong or effective in protecting the public’s interest in water.
The sections below summarize the provisions of major federal laws that impact
water allocation and management. In section G we discuss collaborative approaches,
which typically work outside of established institutions. These approaches frequently are
used when the actual environmental regulations are enforced.

1. Environmental Impact Assessment Requirements
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.A. secs.
4321-4370, 4321(2)(a)(1)) requires the assessment of potential environmental impacts of
proposed “major federal actions.” After a public participation process, an agency
completing this analysis explains its decision in a document known as an environmental
impact statement (42 U.S.C.A. sec. 4332(2)(c)). NEPA applies to proposals that require
a federal approval or license or to use water in federal facilities where there will be a
significant environmental impact. A few western states, including California and
Washington, have adopted laws with similar requirements for projects permitted or
sponsored by the state. The state or federal laws that require an assessment of
environmental impacts are important mechanisms for evaluating the effects of water
development and transfer. The information that is developed is valuable in providing a
fair and comprehensive review of the public interest. NEPA is essentially a procedural
requirement and does not mandate that a final decision be environmentally benign. It

12

only requires that the agency adequately present complete information before making its
decision.

2. Clean Water Act
Water quality can decline with excessive depletions of a watercourse because the
contaminants become more concentrated in the remaining flows. With some exceptions,
however, state water agencies consider exclusively issues related to the quantity being
allocated and not the quality.
Generally water quality is protected by the Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 U.S.C.A.
secs. 1271-1387). Although CWA is a federal law, it is administered by most states.
Under the CWA, anyone who makes a “point source” discharge of pollutants into the
water must have a permit that limits the quantity of particular pollutants according to
standards established by the federal government (33 U.S.C.A. sec. 1362(14)). The permit
also must require sufficient limitations on discharges to protect the overall quality of the
watercourse receiving the waste water. Standards for water quality are set by the states
and are specific to particular waterways. The permitting program has effectively
regulated industries and municipal sewage treatment plants that discharge wastes into
rivers and lakes.
The CWA does not deal with declines in water quality caused by other than point
source discharges. There are provisions in the Act that encourage states to take action to
control non-point sources and a requirement that they identify waterways where the water
quality is not effectively controlled by point source regulation. The states are then to
impose “total maximum daily loads” of pollutants. Lacking any firm enforcement
mechanisms and surrounded by political criticism, this part of the program had not been
fully implemented. The nation still has neither an effective program to prevent non-point
source pollution nor any formal controls of water depletions to protect water quality.
The potential effects of depletions from new diversions or transfers away from the
stream on water quality can be considered as part of the process of public interest review
but this is rarely done because states typically separate their administration of water
allocation and water quality (Getches et. al. 1991). More typically, water laws protect the
right to use a quantity of water even if it causes deterioration in water quality. When
state water allocation laws come in conflict with water quality laws, the right to use water
is recognized as superior to the protection of water quality.

3. Riverbed and Wetland Protection
A special program under §404 of the Clean Water Act regulates “dredging and
filling” of “navigable waters.” The statute defines navigable waters as all “waters of the
United States.” This has been interpreted administratively to include all adjacent
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wetlands, and wetlands are defined as any area capable of sustaining riparian vegetation.
The activities covered are more than traditional dredge and fill operations undertaken to
deepen channels for navigation. Depositing “fill material” can include any construction
in a waterway or wetland. Thus, the statute covers water projects, dams, and diversion
structures.
The impact of § 404 on water development is much greater than pollutant
discharge regulations. Almost any type of construction activity to develop or use water
occurs in or on the banks of a stream or technically interferes with a wetland. Where
wetlands are affected by water development activity, §404 requires the United States
Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a global review of the public interest. In practice,
the authority exercised by the Corps of Engineers is not nearly as broad as its powers,
although the potential scope of its public interest inquiry is great.

4. Endangered Species Protection
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) (16 U.S.C.A. secs. 1531-1543) is
another federal statute that can affect proposals to divert, develop, or transfer water. The
ESA absolutely prohibits any action by the federal government that would jeopardize the
continued existence of an endangered species. Federal agencies considering activities
that could jeopardize endangered species are required by §7 of the ESA to consult with
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to determine the effects of the development or action
on the habitat of any endangered species. If, in the opinion of the Fish and Wildlife
Service the action would jeopardize the endangered species, the action cannot go forward
unless there is a reasonable and prudent alternative that will not cause the jeopardy.
The ESA is extremely powerful because nearly every major water project – not
just those undertaken directly by the federal government – requires some kind of federal
approval (such as under §404 of the Clean Water Act), or receives federal financing.
Thus, the ESA has proved to be a formidable barrier to water development that could be
destructive of fish or wildlife habitat where endangered species are found. The Act,
indeed, may be the most significant law affecting new water development.
Another section of the statute, §9, prohibits actions that “take” or “harass” an
endangered species. These terms are broadly interpreted to include harm to the habitats
of endangered species. Unlike §7, which is specific to federal agency actions, §9 extends
to private actions. The section has rarely been applied to private water development or
uses. In one exceptional case, however, the Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation District
killed several Chinook salmon while operating its pump diversion facility. The Chinook
are an endangered species. The state court enjoined the irrigation district’s activities,
prohibiting it from possessing or taking the endangered species (Department of Fish and
Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation District, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 222 (Cal. App. 1992)).
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5.

Federal Power Act

For many years, federal law has required licenses for hydroelectric-generating
dams located on navigable waterways or their tributaries. Congress enacted the Federal
Power Act of 1920 (16 U.S.C.A. sec. 790 et. seq.) to promote the coordinated
development of rivers, and established a licensing agency known as the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) to grant licenses for uses “best adapted to a
comprehensive plan” for each river (16 U.S.C.A. sec. 803). FERC considers a variety of
issues related to economics and other subjects. Although the Federal Power Act contains
a provision saying that nothing in it shall affect state water laws, and another requires that
an applicant for a license must show that it has complied with state laws, states cannot
prevent a dam under the jurisdiction of FERC from being licensed and constructed (First
Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U.S. 152 (1946)).
Thus, state water law is subordinate to FERC’s licensing authority.
Especially relevant to protection of the public interest is the mandate in the
Federal Power Act that FERC’s planning for a river should take into account all
“beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes” (Udall v. Federal Power
Commission, 387 U.S. 428, 449 (1967) (citing 16 U.S.C. 797(e)). This has been held to
include consideration of the effects of the dam on anadromous fish (Udall v. Federal
Power Commission, 387 U.S. at 450). Not surprisingly, older projects were built with
little concern for such uses as fish and wildlife or recreation and subsequently have
proved to be highly detrimental to fish. Historically, FERC was primarily concerned
with maximizing a river’s potential for hydroelectric power development. The agency
did try to prevent negative impacts on navigation, but other public interests were not
serious obstacles to the construction of dams.
In recent years, however, as the licenses for old dams expired often after a term of
fifty years, the commission has been more mindful of other public interests. This is
partly the result of amendments to the Act and partly because of the enactment of the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934 (16 U.S.C.A. secs. 661-667, 661) which requires
FERC to give “equal consideration” to protection of fish and wildlife.
FERC now requires dam owners to release water in amounts and at times needed
for fish and wildlife and other environmental purposes. These requirements have brought
FERC into conflict with state agencies in some cases. Typically, the conflict has been
over whether FERC or the state that issues water rights for the project has the last word
on how much water must be left in the stream or that must by-pass the dam to protect fish
habitat. In one major case, the state of California tried to impose requirements on a
power company for the benefit of fish. The Supreme Court held that the preemptive
force of the Federal Power Act left such matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of
FERC, so that the less protective requirements would apply (California v. Federal
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Energy Regulatory Commission, 495 U.S. 490 (1990)); it is sufficient if FERC considers
the recommendations of the state fish and wildlife agency.
FERC’s reputation for environmental protection is mixed. Although it has a
strong environmental mandate, it often fights tenaciously to license dams that are subject
to more lax requirements than a state would impose. There are, however, modern
examples of the agency taking significant protective action. In some cases, state laws are
not strict and FERC’s requirements, such as requiring by-pass flows for fish, are the only
public interest requirements. In a few recent cases, the commission has considered
requiring removal of dams subject to relicensing in order to restore a fishery. The
Edwards Dam in Maine, for instance, was removed in 1837. Two dams that have
blocked salmon migration in the Elwha River basin in Washington are targeted for
removal, and a hydroelectric dam at the confluence of the Blackfoot and Clark Fork
Rivers in Montana may give way for a whitewater recreation park.

6. Wild and Scenic River Designation
Under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C.A. secs. 1271-1287)
rivers may be designated by Congress or by a state-nomination process to be protected
against future development that would impair their free-flowing character as it exists at
the time of designation. The primary effect of designation is that the federal government
under its various regulatory programs cannot authorize water projects that obstruct the
flow of the river. For instance, FERC cannot license new projects on these rivers. In
addition, designation of a river effectively reserves a water right to the federal
government preventing depletions of the stream that would impair the flows to the extent
that the purpose of the designation would be defeated.

7. River Restoration Laws
In the past decade, Congress enacted several laws calling for large-scale
restoration of river environments. The Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 (106 Stat.
4600), for example, ordered the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to change the way it
operates the Glen Canyon Dam in order to improve the downstream riparian and aquatic
habitats. As a result of the act, the Bureau conducted an experimental “flood flow” in
1996–a large release intended to mimic historical spring runoff conditions in which high
water levels with heavy sediment loads restored beaches and revitalized backwater native
fish-rearing habitats. The act explicitly directed the Bureau to manage the Glen Canyon
Dam to protect, mitigate, and improve the natural and cultural resources of the river
downstream–a dramatic expansion of the project’s purposes when compared with the
original authorizing legislation.
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In another example of legislatively mandated habitat restoration, the Central
Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (106 Stat. 4706-4731) directed the Secretary of
the Interior to dedicate and manage annually 800,000 acre-feet of water from the Central
Valley Project for the primary purpose of fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration in
California’s vast and fertile Sacramento-San Joaquin River Valley. Although this water
was classified as “surplus,” irrigators participating in the large federal project had
enjoyed its use during dry years, and thus faced cutbacks as a result of the new emphasis
on habitat restoration. The act also required these water users to pay surcharges on
irrigation water to finance environmental restoration. The law’s enactment culminated a
successful lobbying effort by a coalition of diverse interests: environmental groups,
commercial and sport fishermen, duck hunters, waterfowl organizations, Native
Americans, and urban and business interests.

G. Ad Hoc Negotiations and Other Collaborative Processes
Collaborative efforts among stakeholders (water rights holders and others) show
promise for resolving conflicts between public interests and private rights shaped
particularly for the river or locale in which the conflict arises. Dozens of initiatives
throughout the western U.S. demonstrate the potential for these locally based, problemsolving entities.
In some cases, such groups have solved problems of diminished streamflows in
popular fisheries by crafting voluntary agreements among water rights holders to change
the timing of withdrawals; in return, fisheries proponents have agreed not to seek
regulatory changes to the appropriators’ water rights.
Sometimes third parties affected by a proposed water development, use or transfer
are able to persuade the proponents to take voluntary action to protect the interests of the
public. Unless there is a public process provided for under the law, it is difficult to
initiate these negotiations. Only when third parties have sufficient political or legal
leverage (for example, the threat of a veto under the Endangered Species Act) will the
proponent of the development activity participate in negotiations. The fundamental
problem with relying on negotiated resolutions of problems caused for third parties or the
public in general as a result of water development or use is that the results are a function
of the political power of the objectors. The results, then, are not consistent among similar
projects and often provide incomplete relief where the objectors lack political or legal
strength.
At the least, collaborative groups offer a forum for better expression of public
interests. As they grow larger in scale of focus (such as whole river basins or major
drainages) and number of participants, the proceedings take on more legal and political
implications and their outcomes are more likely to require legislative enactment for
implementation.
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H. Conclusion
Everyone has an interest in the way water is used. When water is committed to
new uses, or those uses are changed, or water is transferred, it creates impacts on the
values of people besides those with water rights.
It is extremely important to ensure adequate protection for values that are widely
held and of substantial interest to the public. Economic theory indicates that society will
gain from the efficient allocation and reallocation of water rights; this argues for
operation of free markets without excessive restrictions. Better protection of third parties
increases the costs to the government of reviewing proposed transactions. Nevertheless,
it is the obligation of governments to find effective and efficient methods to preserve the
values of members of the public affected by water decisions.
Taken together, the several mechanisms for protection of the public interest create
rather uneven results. In some cases there is ample protection of fish and wildlife and no
consideration for recreation. In some states there is little protection under prevailing
water laws, so that the only type of protection is under federal laws. In other places state
and federal agencies compete for control of water projects, not necessarily to ensure
greater protection but to preserve their relative scope of jurisdiction.
One way to add greater predictability for both the public and for water developers
would be for each state to establish a dynamic and comprehensive system of water
planning. Issues like the impacts on rural communities, environmental effects, protection
of fisheries, wetlands, recreation, and drinking water can all be covered as well as flood
control. Only a few states have this type of water plan. Such a plan can provide
standards that enable the decision maker under almost any of the programs now in place
to judge a proposal more wisely and fairly. A comprehensive plan would include a
panoply of values and interests that could be affected by the development, transfer, or use
of water. The plan could also discuss the relative importance to society of the values and
their impacts.
Experts in the field of water law and policy should pursue methods to reduce the
costs and increase the benefits of water use by providing broader and more effective
protection of the public against negative effects of water decisions. A combination of
administrative review designed to protect the interests of the public, laws to protect
instream flows, and environmental regulation has provided some protection in the
western states. Protection could be further improved by establishing a planning process
to develop water policy that is more coherent and predictable.

3. Indigenous Rights and Interests
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Protecting the rights of indigenous peoples arguably should be part of advancing
the public interest. But it is more complicated because the “public interest” furthered by
satisfying national obligations to tribes sometimes conflicts with the policies or asserted
governmental authority of state governments. In this respect, the conflict is similar to the
tension between federal enactments that promote the national environmental interest and
state policies that arise from more localized or short-term interests. Besides the
complication created by the federal system in the United States, protection of Indian
rights also has been inhibited by the tribes’ lack of influence in national politics. On the
other hand, U.S. law recognizes certain sovereign rights and property interests of tribes.
The foundational principles in Indian law tracing to the earliest days of the nation
define a fiduciary relationship in which the national government is charged with
protecting the rights of tribes in their lands. The same early cases give the Congress
broad powers to implement this obligation but also to extinguish rights when lawmakers
determine that it is in the interest of the country to do so. This great federal power in the
area of Indian affairs has been invoked frequently to limit states’ efforts to encroach on
the property rights and self-governing authority of tribes within their territory.
In modern times the federal policy toward Indian tribes has favored selfdetermination and economic self-sufficiency, but this has not always been the case. In
the late nineteenth century, for instance, national policy sought to assimilate Indians into
the mainstream of society by ending their communal pursuits, breaking up tribal land
holdings, and promoting individual farm cultivation. Whether the national goal has been
to promote individual or collective self-sufficiency on the lands reserved for tribes and
their members, access to sufficient amounts of water to make the lands useful has always
been essential.
Water is necessary for agriculture in arid environments and to maintain the habitat
needed to sustain fish life. And for tribes, the integrity of land, water, and the natural
world is often at the heart of traditional cultures and spiritual life. Tribes of the Great
Plains were placed on reservations and told to give up their far-ranging hunts. In the
desert Southwest, some tribes had established irrigation cultures using the sparse and
seasonal streams. In the Northwest and Great Lakes regions reservations were created
that limited the homelands and the historic fishing pursuits of native peoples.
In each case, encroaching populations of non-Indians and the resulting
competition for water and water-dependent resources threatened the ability of Indians to
survive on their reservations. Nonetheless, national policies in the era of homesteading
and westward expansion encouraged this settlement. The resulting establishment of nonIndian communities and creation of property rights in land and water have conflicted and
competed with the Indians’ capacity to use natural resources.
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In the early days of the twentieth century the United States Supreme Court
announced a remarkable doctrine of water rights that favored Indian tribes in their
attempts to secure sufficient water to make their reservations useful. The “reserved rights
doctrine” guaranteed tribes the right to use water to fulfill the purposes for which their
reservations were established. The right could be exercised anytime in the future, even if
non-Indians had used the water first and had been granted rights under state law.
The history of the tribes’ exercise of their ostensibly bold and potent reserved
water rights for Indian reservations has been problematical. The tribes have lacked
capital to put their water rights to use and now they compete with non-Indians who have
built their economies using the water to which the Indians are rightfully entitled. Tribes
have remained in a state of poverty and reservations are largely undeveloped. Some
tribes near population centers have sought economic development by legalizing
gambling. Their independent sovereignty makes them immune from state laws
prohibiting gambling. But in most places long-term, economic well-being and cultural
survival on their reservations depend on asserting and using their water rights for
agricultural or industrial development.
Increasingly, tribes have pressed for a vindication of their theoretically great but
actually underutilized water rights. The non-Indians know that the inchoate rights of the
tribes pose a threat to their economic security. Because investments and property values
are undermined by uncertainty, non-Indians and the western states that tend to support
non-Indian interests have also urged that Indian water rights should be legally
determined. Judicial processes now underway in most states are lengthy and expensive.
In recent years several tribes’ water rights have been resolved in negotiated settlements
and implemented through federal legislation. This remains the preferred method of
quantifying tribal water rights primarily because it infuses federal funding into solutions
that enable tribes to use their water rights and it protects established non-Indian uses.

A. A Brief History of Indian Water Rights
There are hundreds of Indian reservations in the western United States. In the
nineteenth century, tribes who once hunted, fished, and gathered over large expanses of
land were confined to reservations in order to reduce conflict with white settlers. In
successive treaties and agreements the tribes agreed, often reluctantly or under pressure,
to move onto smaller reservations. Typically the government sought to convert the
Indians into farmers. Because the West is an arid region where agriculture is difficult
without irrigation, most reservations required a supply of water if the Indians were to
sustain life.
Other reservations were located along rivers to ensure that Indians could continue
fishing to sustain their livelihoods and culture. Again, water was necessary to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation. As a general matter, it is correct to say that all reservations
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were intended to be permanent homelands for the tribes, where they could survive and be
self-sufficient. Invariably, the reservations required water.
The fundamental legal principle giving rise to Indian water rights is stated simply:
The establishment of a reservation results in an implied reservation of a right to take
water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of reserving the land for the Indians. In the words
of the United States Supreme Court:
The reservation was a part of a very much larger tract which the Indians had the
right to occupy and use and which was adequate for the habits and wants of a
nomadic and uncivilized people. It was the policy of the Government, it was the
desire of the Indians to change those habits and to come pastoral and civilized
people. If they should become such the original tract was too extensive, by a
smaller tract would be inadequate without a change of conditions. The lands were
arid and, without irrigation, were practically valueless. . . . The Indians had
command of the lands and the waters – command of all their beneficial use,
whether kept for hunting, “and grazing roving herds of stock,” or turned to
agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they reduce
the area of their occupation and give up the waters which make it valuable or
adequate? (Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908)).
The Supreme Court announced the doctrine of “reserved water rights” in Winters.
The case arose on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana where the Indians had
been placed after a series of treaties that had limited them to a small fraction of their
former territory. The Court recognized the government’s intention of “civilizing” the
Indians by making individual farmers of them and breaking up the communally held
tribal lands. The government plan involved dividing up the reservation lands into
individual land holdings, allotting the land to heads of Indian families to be cultivated,
and then opening the rest of the land on and off the reservation for non-Indian
homesteaders. Without sufficient irrigation water for the reservation, this civilizing
scheme would fail. If the individual allotment policy fell, lands desired by settlers – the
so-called “surplus lands” on reservations and former reservations – would not be
available for white settlement.
It would have been grossly unfair to the Indians to confine them to reservations
without the means to eke out a living. Moreover, the plan for obtaining and distributing
former Indian land to non-Indians would have failed if the tribes could not survive on
their reservations. Thus, the reserved rights doctrine of Winters became the cardinal rule
of Indian water rights. It was later applied to federal reservations of land for parks,
forests, military bases, and other public uses (Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963)). As with Indian lands the quantity of water reserved depended on the purposes
for which the reservation was established.
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Over the years, the reserved rights doctrine has promised more than it has
delivered. The government has rarely applied it in litigation to assert rights as against
non-Indian water users. The Indians themselves, until about thirty years ago, often
lacked their own attorneys to represent them in protecting their water rights. They were
sometimes represented by government attorneys in water litigation where the government
had a conflict of interest. Meanwhile, non-Indians built dams and diverted water from
streams and initiated uses that depended on that water.
Non-Indian water development was often planned and paid for by the federal
government, which is ironic considering the well-established legal principle in American
Indian law that the government is charged with responsibility to act for the benefit of
Indian tribes. The National Water Commission found in its 1973 report that:
Following Winters, . . . the United States was pursuing a policy of encouraging
the settlement of the West and the creation of family-sized farms on its arid lands.
In retrospect, it can be seen that this policy was pursued with little or no regard
for Indian water rights and the Winters doctrine. With the encouragement, or at
least the cooperation, of the Secretary of the Interior – the very office entrusted
with the protection of all Indian rights – many large irrigation projects were
constructed on streams that flowed through or bordered Indian Reservations,
sometimes above and more often below the Reservations. With few exceptions
the projects were planned and built by the Federal Government without any
attempt to define, let alone protect, prior rights that Indian tribes might have had
in the waters used for the projects. . . . In the history of the United States
Government’s treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to protect Indian water rights
for use on the Reservations it set aside for them is on of the sorrier chapters
(National Water Commission 1973, 474-475).
Many decades after the Supreme Court first articulated the reserved water rights
doctrine, Indian water rights finally gained considerable attention when the Court issued
its opinion in Arizona v. California (373 U.S. 546 (1963)). The case involved an
allocation of the Colorado River’s flow among three of the states that touch the river.
The United States, which was involved in the case because the river also crosses
extensive Indian and federal lands, claimed reserved rights for five tribes along the river.
The Supreme Court awarded those tribes 900,000 acre-feet of water per year – a huge
quantity of water – which it determined by calculating how much water would be
required to irrigate all of the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations. This sent a
strong message to water users all over the West that Indian claims could be made to
formidable amounts of water. The reserved rights doctrine had been idle, but it was far
from dead.
As explained earlier, prior appropriation was the historical method for allocating
water in the American West. Although this doctrine has been altered in various ways and
embellished with rules that satisfy important public purposes, most of the West’s water
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long ago was allocated to the earliest users of water. The most valuable rights are the
oldest because in times of shortage the holders of those rights can insist on delivery of the
full quantity of water to which they are entitled. Accordingly, when senior users assert
their rights, the most junior users often must curtail their water uses. The Supreme Court
created reserved water rights to fit into the priority system, with a tribe’s priority date
established by the date its reservation was established. Because most reservations were
established more than one hundred years ago, the accompanying water rights are usually
quite senior.
This ability to fix a precise priority date for a tribe’s water right makes it possible
to determine which uses potentially must be cut back in order to allow water to flow to
the reservation. That is, the tribe’s position in the system of priorities is easy to
determine. But the scope of the right – and thus its impacts on other water users -remains uncertain until the quantity of water to which the tribe is entitled is determined.
This is not an issue when non-Indians’ water rights are established in the prior
appropriation system because the quantity of their rights is determined based on the
amount of water actually used in the past. The fact that reserved rights can exist without
a history of actual use, then, can deprive neighboring water users of certainty. This lack
of certainty can frustrate non-Indian neighbors when they seek to make investments or
borrow money based on assumptions about how much water is generally available to
them.
One solution to this uncertainty is to quantify Indian reserved rights. This can be
done judicially by asking a court to decide how much water is necessary to fulfill the
purposes of a reservation. Where the purpose of setting up the reservation was to allow
the Indians to pursue agriculture, the courts follow the formulation in Arizona v.
California (373 U.S. 546 (1963)) based on the reservation’s practicably irrigable acreage
(PIA). In arid areas the amount of water needed to produce crops can be enormous; in
adopting the PIA formula, the Supreme Court opened the way for tribes to claim huge
quantities of water. The Court expressly rejected the idea that tribes should just get
merely a “fair share” of the water in a river or that rights should be determined based on
reservation populations. The court said that rights were not to meet present needs, but to
meet future needs and therefore should be set according to the reservation’s full capacity
to use water.
A court seeking to determine how much land is irrigable and how much water is
required for irrigation must examine evidence of soil type, structure, and depth,
topography, salinity content, possible crops, and climate. As this information usually is
based on expert studies in hydrology, soil science, engineering, and economics, trials can
be long and expensive. Given the importance of scarce water, the process can also be
contentious.
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B. Tribal Rights are Determined by State Courts
The United States has two separate court systems, state and federal. The
individual court systems of the fifty states have local courts with general jurisdiction and
appellate court systems. These state courts usually handle water rights matters arising
within a particular state. The United States generally is not subject to the jurisdiction of
state courts, and the principle of sovereign immunity provides that the United States
cannot be sued without its consent. Thus, ordinarily state courts would not be able to
adjudicate federal reserved water rights. Similarly, Indian tribes are also considered
sovereign governments with sovereign immunity from suit without their consent or the
consent of the U.S. Congress.
Federal courts, with district courts sitting in every state and a separate system of
appeals, have more limited jurisdiction than state courts. The primary task of federal
courts is adjudicating “federal questions,” including interpretation and application of
federal laws. This can include determining how much water a tribe would be entitled to
use for a reservation established under a treaty or agreement with the United States. The
U.S. Congress decided in the 1950s, however, that when a state court takes jurisdiction
over the adjudication of all water rights in a river, the United States will waive its
sovereign immunity to suit and the state court can determine all federal water rights. It
passed a law authorizing state courts to adjudicate Indian reserved rights, called the
McCarran Amendment of 1952 (43 U.S.C.A. sec. 666).
Congress recognized in the McCarran Amendment the importance to non-Indians
of knowing clearly the extent of water rights of others with whom they compete for water
in times of shortage under the prior appropriation doctrine. The law applies to all water
rights of which the United States is the “owner.” Although the United States only holds
title to Indian water rights in trust for the tribes, the Supreme Court has held that
Congress intended to extend state jurisdiction over those rights whenever the rights to an
entire river were being adjudicated (Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810 (1976)). This caused great concern for tribes because
they feared that state courts were likely to be less equitable to them than federal courts.
There is a history of tension between tribes and states. The Supreme Court long ago
described the situation of Indians relative to states: “They owe no allegiance to the states,
and receive from them no protection. Because of local ill feeling the people of the States
where they are found are often their deadliest enemies” (United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 384 (1886)).
After the Supreme Court made it clear that Indian water rights were subject to
determination in state courts, many states initiated “general stream adjudications” -- legal
proceedings involving sometimes tens of thousands of water rights claimants in an entire
river basin. These cost and complexity of these proceedings have proved burdensome to
everyone. Some of these adjudications have continued for over twenty years and have
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not neared completion. Today, there are over sixty Indian water rights cases pending in
state courts.
Although Indians believed that state courts would not provide fair trials for their
water rights claims, the results have been mixed. In most cases the tribes have been able
to prevail on the United States as their trustee to furnish lawyers and expert witnesses.
Alliances of government and tribal lawyers have presented cases competently to the
courts. In some cases, the state courts have awarded tribes impressively high quantities
of water. Yet the overall record is not reassuring to critics who say that relegating tribal
rights to the mercies of state courts is bound to be unfair to Indians.
In the adjudication of the Big Horn River, for example, the Wyoming Supreme
Court affirmed the right the tribes of the Wind River Reservation to some 400,000 acrefeet of water, most of the water in the river (In re General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, affirmed, Wyoming v. United
States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989)). Undeniably, the amount of water, based on a lower court’s
determination of the amount of irrigable acreage on the reservation, is enormous. Yet the
state supreme court rejected the tribes’ claims for water to be used for mineral
development, fisheries, wildlife, and aesthetics. It also rejected the tribes’ attempt to
extend their reserved water rights to groundwater. Many scholars and at least some other
courts differ with each of these holdings. Whether or not the state court erred in defining
the scope of the tribes’ reserved water rights, it awarded them enough water to
overshadow the impacts of those parts of the decision. The state challenged the decision
in the United States Supreme Court but the state court decision was upheld, although
barely; the Justices on the Supreme Court were divided by a vote of four to four.
The Big Horn case is the only state court adjudication of Indian water rights that
has proceeded through final judgment and appeal to the Supreme Court. But other state
courts have handed down rulings in general stream adjudications, some favorable and
some unfavorable to Indian tribes. In Arizona, the state supreme court has held that the
treatment of groundwater under state law as a resource that is allocated and managed
under a regime entirely separate from surface water could not affect any rights the tribes
had to groundwater under the reserved rights doctrine because those rights were a matter
of federal law (San Carlos Apache Tribe v. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz.
1999)). In Idaho, however, the state courts have rejected tribal claims to exemption from
the state adjudication process under the McCarran Amendment (In re Snake River Basin
Water System, 764 P.2d 78 (Idaho 1988)).
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C. Negotiated Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims as an Alternative to
Litigation
The results in state court adjudications of Indian water rights vary, but all are
terribly costly and take years to conclude. The combination of unpredictability and the
burdens of litigation have induced all parties to consider seriously negotiation as an
alternative to litigation. Since the 1980s there have been about 18 negotiated settlements
of Indian water rights. Settlement negotiations usually are commenced after a tribe or the
United States becomes involved in litigation with a state and non-Indian water users.
Sometimes this is part of a general stream adjudication started by a state under the
McCarran Amendment. It also can follow litigation in federal courts brought by the tribe
or the United States. In a few cases settlement negotiations have begun without
litigation.
Negotiations typically allow for all interested parties to participate. Sometimes
they require court decisions to decide basic legal questions like the tribe’s priority date.
Negotiations are most useful when there are factual disagreements based on technical
data. Rather than dwell on these contests, the parties seek to craft a solution that will
satisfy at least some of their respective needs. Instead of an all-or-nothing court decision
with a clear-cut victory for one side, they seek ways to provide recognition for tribal
water rights without jeopardizing existing water uses. Although the tribes may not
receive the full quantities of water originally or potentially claimed, they often get money
– mostly from the federal government – to enable them to build facilities to put their
quantified water rights to use.
The “lubrication” of federal funding has been a key element in most Indian water
rights settlements. It has allowed for tribes to secure not only paper water rights, but also
“wet water” delivered through irrigation systems and pipelines for domestic supplies. At
the same time, non-Indians have gained assurance that they can continue using water
under water rights that are junior to tribal water rights. Sometimes federal or state
funding is also assured for projects that benefit non-Indian water users. Because funding
is usually part of a settlement package, an agreement reached by the various parties in
negotiation usually must be approved and monies appropriated by Congress. Thus,
settlements are almost always accompanied by federal, and sometimes accompanying
state legislation. Although each Indian water rights settlement is unique, several
examples illustrate how they work.
Congress has approved two water settlements in Arizona. In 1978, the Ak-Chin
Indian Community agreed with the Secretary of the Interior to forgo a substantial amount
of water claims against non-Indian users in exchange for 85,000 acre-feet of irrigation
water provided by a federal well-field water project (Public Law No. 95-328, 42 Stat. 409
(1978); Public Law No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698 (1984); Public Law No. 102-497, 106 Stat.
3528 (1992)). Using the well water on the Ak-Chin reservation, however, would deplete
the groundwater under the Papago Indian reservation. In order to avoid this problem, the
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Department of Interior renegotiated a water contract with an irrigation district, which
received its water from the Colorado River to deliver its surplus water to the tribe. In
1982, the San Xavier Band of the Tohono O’Odham Nation first settled its groundwater
claims without involving the federal government in the settlement process. The tribe
could not proceed without the federal government participation and financial support in
the final water settlement. The bill was ultimately approved (Public Law No. 97-293, 96
Stat. 1274 (1982)). These water settlements exemplify successful water negotiations,
which provide the tribes with promises for delivered water and a consideration of their
reserved water rights.
Each settlement is different because the legal, geographic, and economic
situations of tribes vary and so do the political factors. The ability of tribe and its
neighbors in one state to achieve a settlement will differ with the relative power of the
members of Congress that represent that state. The receptiveness of Congress to
settlements will also vary depending on the economic health of the federal government at
the time a settlement package is presented. Notwithstanding the inevitable differences
among them, a review of the Indian water rights settlements to date that are summarized
in Figure 1 shows several characteristics that are common to many of them.
•

Federal investment in water or water facilities. By providing funds to build
dams and delivery works, the settlement can ensure delivery of water to both
Indians and non-Indians.

•

Non-federal cost-sharing. A typical condition of providing federal funds is that
state or local governments bear a portion of the cost of the settlement.

•

Creation of tribal trust fund. Cash funds are usually appropriated for the use of
the tribes. Sometimes the money is to be used for water development and
sometimes it is available generally for economic development.

•

Limited off-reservation water marketing. For various reason, tribes that are
entitled to water rights cannot or do not want to use all of their water on their
reservations. Allowing them to lease water for use by non-Indians off the
reservation can provide cash income that can help build the tribe’s economic selfsufficiency while allowing non-Indians to use water they need. Under the legal
systems governing water in the West, water rights can be transferred with few
restrictions beyond protection of other water rights holders. Denying tribes the
same right seems inequitable. Most settlement packages allow the tribes to
market their water but nearly all restrict these transfers more than the transfer of
non-Indian water rights are restricted.

•

Deference to state law. Often the settlements require that Indian water use be
subject to state water law, at least when the water is used off the reservation.
Where two or more states enter into a compact allocating the use of a river that is
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the source of water used to satisfy tribal water rights claims, the Indian water
rights settlement agreement and accompanying legislation usually provide that the
compact will govern water use.
•

Concern for efficiency, conservation, and the environment. Less pervasive
among the settlements but included in many of them is a provision for improving
the efficiency of water use and advancing environmental values.

•

Benefits for Non-Indians. Perhaps the most important characteristic of Indian
water settlements in terms of giving them political viability is that they provide
benefits for non-Indians. At a minimum, they receive certainty that their
established water uses can continue. If the United States agrees to build water
facilities they may get access to water that will allow new uses. In some cases,
non-Indians have been able to obtain federal funding for projects that otherwise
would have been politically impossible. They have succeeded in the context of
Indian water rights settlements, however, by “wrapping their projects in an Indian
blanket.”

D. Current Issues
1. Finality of Determinations of Rights
One of the goals of non-Indians in seeking quantification of Indian rights is to
provide the certainty they need in order to make investments and borrow money to build
water projects and to develop their lands. This was surely a motive for enactment of the
McCarran Amendment. Tribes also can benefit from knowing the extent of their rights as
they try to attract investments in water facilities and otherwise to realize value from the
important asset of water rights. Yet the tribes that have had their water rights adjudicated
have learned that they must suffer the consequences if they have inadequate legal
representation in the litigation of their claims. Even if mistakes are made, they cannot
later return to court and ask for their water rights to be adjusted because that would
disrupt non-Indian expectations. The likelihood that the outcome of a quantification will
be immutable raises a serious concern for any tribe embarking on a quantification of its
water rights.
In two cases where tribes had their rights fixed in the past and wanted to reopen
cases to expand their rights, the Supreme Court has refused to allow any change in tribal
rights. In Arizona v. California (373 U.S. 546 (1963)) five tribes along the Colorado
River had been represented in court by the U.S. Department of Justice. Attorneys for the
U.S. failed to claim all of the tribes’ practicably irrigable acreage. Thus, the tribes’ water
rights were limited to the quantity needed for the irrigable lands claimed by the
government. The tribes later hired their own lawyers and experts and reopened the case.
They proved that additional lands were irrigable and asked the Supreme Court to award a
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greater quantity of water. But the Supreme Court in 1983, twenty years after the original
decision, held that the quantification could not be changed except where there was
actually an error in boundaries that a court had corrected (Arizona v. California, 460 U.S.
605 (1983)). The Supreme Court said there is a “strong interest in finality” in western
water law and therefore it would be unfair to the non-Indians who had relied on the
earlier decision if the tribes were allowed to increase their claims.
In another case, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe also had depended on the United
States to protect its interests in court. Early in the twentieth century the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation built a federal irrigation project to benefit non-Indian farmers. The tribe
historically depended on fishing, and its reservation consisted almost entirely of a large
lake. The federal water project diverted nearly all of the water from the single stream
that supplied water to the lake. The U.S. went to state court to secure the necessary water
right before building the project. Purporting to represent both the tribe and the irrigation
project, the federal government claimed only water rights sufficient to irrigate the Indian
lands in the narrow ring of land around the lake, and claimed no water to maintain the
Indians’ fishery. Without water to sustain the fishery and the lake level, the lake shrunk
and the fish started to die off.
Years later the tribe, through its own attorneys, proved that the U.S. had failed to
claim sufficient water rights due to its conflict of interest and got a lower court to order
the government to take action consistent with its trust responsibility and stop diverting all
the water to the reclamation project. The U.S. also was forced to reopen the old case that
had given the tribe inadequate water rights. But, on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to let the case be reopened, citing the interest of the non-Indians in having
certainty in their water rights (Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354
F.Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972), supplemented by 360 F.Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), reversed,
499 F.2d 1095 (D.C.Cir. 1974), certiorari denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975)).
The outcomes in these two cases make it imperative for tribes whose reserved
water rights are being determined to participate fully and aggressively in asserting the full
extent of those rights. This is difficult for tribes with limited financial resources. In
recent times the United States has provided funding for some tribes for lawyers and
experts, however, even when it has represented the tribes as a trustee.
The daunting specter of a final and unalterable judgment may provide an
argument against seeking an adjudication of reserved water rights. In most cases,
however, tribes have no choice about whether to adjudicate their rights because the
United States can be sued any time a state initiates a general stream adjudication and
must claim all federal and Indian water rights. Although the tribe, as a sovereign
government, remains immune from being sued, the rulings of the Supreme Court teach
that if the tribe abstains from the litigation it does so at its peril.
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2.

Water Marketing

One of the most controversial questions concerning Indian water rights is whether
tribes can sell or lease their water to non-Indians outside their reservations. In many
cases, the government decided that Indians should become farmers, and moved them to
reservations for that purpose. Some tribes do not have a cultural tradition that is based on
agriculture, however, or are unable to produce a livelihood because they were put on
reservations that are too small or that have poor lands for farming. This has led some
tribes to consider allowing others to use their water off the reservation. As we have
explained earlier, most of the negotiated settlements of Indian water rights provide for
some off-reservation use of tribal water rights, although it is typically restricted in
location and scope.
Non-Indians control the best agricultural lands on many reservations. The
allotment policy opened up the reservations to non-Indian settlement; today, non-Indians
cultivate 69% of all farmland and have 78% of the irrigated acreage on reservation lands
throughout the nation. Moreover, in the last one hundred years, the allotments issued to
individual Indians have descended through inheritance to an unwieldy number of heirs.
The only way to put these lands to use is to lease them, usually to non-Indian farmers. A
share of the tribe’s reserved water rights attaches to allotted lands and the right to use
water can go with a lease to non-Indians (Skeem v. United States, 273 Fed. 93 (9th Cir.
1921); 25 U.S.C. sec. 415).
There is considerable debate about whether tribes should have the legal right to
allow their water rights to be used outside their reservations, however. Opponents of
Indian water marketing argue that the nature of the reserved right is to make reservation
lands useful and this purpose is not fulfilled when water is used elsewhere. Proponents
say that the ultimate purpose of the reservations was to provide a homeland where
Indians could be self-sufficient. This goal may be best achieved if tribes can enter the
marketplace and realize the economic value of tribal resources.
Off-reservation Indian water marketing could provide a way to continue and
expand non-Indian uses. Simply paying Indians for the right to use their water could buy
the certainty that is now lacking for non-Indian users. Nevertheless, non-Indians who
have depended on using undeveloped Indian water without charge do not want to be
forced to start paying for it. They have raised policy and legal arguments against
marketability.
The most substantial legal question about Indian water marketing is whether a
tribe has the legal right to convey what is essentially a property right. One of the oldest
rules of Indian law is that tribes cannot transfer land or rights in land to non-Indians
without the participation or approval of the United States government (Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C.A. sec. 177).
Any legal doubt on this point can be resolved by obtaining congressional consent. This
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consent was granted in several negotiated Indian water settlements that allowed water
marketing. Action by Congress also moots the issue of whether there is a fundamental
conflict between the Supreme Court’s original rationale for reserved water rights and a
tribe’s use of them outside the reservation. In any event the legal restraint on alienation
of Indian property is intended to protect Indian rights from encroachment by non-Indians
or the states. This suggests that the primary concern in whether Indian water should be
marketable is whether the tribes have been dealt with fairly. Presumably, congressional
approval should depend on a finding that it is in the best interests of the tribe.
Some observers have proposed that Congress should authorize tribes to lease their
water rights subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior just as tribes can now
lease tribal lands with secretarial approval. One of the arguments offered in favor of
Indian water leasing is that non-Indians may freely transfer their water and water rights
so long as the rights of others are not harmed. Therefore, it is inequitable to deny tribes
the same attributes for its water rights. As yet, Congress has not seriously considered
legislation for Indian water leasing.

3. Tribal Water Codes and Administration
As sovereigns over their members and territory, Indian tribes can legislate and
regulate water rights. Their ability to do so has been frustrated, however, by political
impediments to the federal government’s approval of tribal water codes and by some
recent decisions of the Supreme Court that limit the reach of tribal regulatory authority
over non-Indians on reservations.
It is clear that a state has no jurisdiction to regulate Indian use of Indian water
rights. This is part of a 150-year legal tradition of maintaining tribal jurisdiction over
Indians and their property on reservations, free from state control. The harder question is
under what circumstances non-Indians on an Indian reservation can be controlled by
tribes and when they are subject to state jurisdiction. Generally, if non-Indians are on
Indian land, they like Indians can be subjected to tribal jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court’s decisions in this area have created doubts about whether tribes can regulate nonIndians, especially if they are on non-Indian owned land.
One case says that a tribe may have jurisdiction over a non-Indian on its
reservation, even on the non-Indian’s fee land, if the non-Indian’s conduct would threaten
or have a “direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and
welfare of the tribe” (450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)). The use of waterways on a reservation
presumably would affect some or all of these interests. But in a case dealing specifically
with the applicability of a tribal water code, United States v. Anderson (736 F.2d 1358
(9th Cir. 1984)), the court held that the tribe lacked the requisite interest to regulate. This
was because the stream in question originated outside the reservation, ran only a short
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way along the reservation boundary, then turned away and joined the Spokane River
outside the reservation.
In Holly v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation (655 F.
Supp. 557 (E.D. Wash. 1985), affirmed subnom, Holly v. Totus, 812 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.
1987), certiorari denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987)) the same court upheld the application of a
tribal water code to non-Indians using water on their land within the reservation where
the stream was entirely on the reservation. The court added, however, that the tribe could
not control “excess” water used by non-Indians – presumably water not subject to
reserved water rights.
It would appear that tribes with comprehensive, well-developed codes and
regulations governing waters on their reservation would be better able to demonstrate the
need to regulate non-Indian water to further tribal interests. For instance, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the exclusive authority of the Mescalero Apache Tribe to regulate
game and fish on its reservation, including hunting and fishing by non-Indians (New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983)). This case did not deal with
regulation on non-Indian land, but the court did emphasize the importance to the tribe of
having unified regulation of a resource like wildlife. Similarly, the political integrity of
tribal government control of resources would depend on unified control of water
resources.
Tribes attempting to enact legislation to regulate water resources on their
reservations do not have support from the U.S. Department of the Interior. Perhaps half
of the tribal constitutions have provisions that require certain tribal legislation to be
approved by the Secretary of the Interior before it will be effective. For twenty-six years
the department has maintained a moratorium on approval of any tribal water codes that
would extend to non-Indian water use. On two occasions the department has circulated
draft regulations governing the approval of such codes, but they were met with a
firestorm of opposition from western senators and congressmen. The federal government
has departed from the moratorium in only a few cases to approve tribal codes as part of
negotiated water settlements approved by Congress.
The last administration voiced sympathy for the tribal effort to regulate water
resources, but did not change the policy. Secretary Bruce Babbitt said that if a tribe
wanted to enact a water code and confronted a requirement for secretarial approval, as is
the case in many tribal constitutions, all the tribe had to do was to amend its constitution
to remove the requirement for secretarial approval of ordinances, and he would approve
the amendment removing the approval requirement so the tribe could adopt a water code
without the need for federal approval. Although not all tribes have a secretarial approval
requirement for tribal codes, and those that do may have a means to remove the
impediment, the apparent policy of the Department of the Interior disfavoring tribal codes
could portend difficulties if code enforcement is challenged by a non-Indian and a court
is called upon to examine the tribe’s authority to enact the provision.
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Notwithstanding the uncertain area of tribal water code enforcement over nonIndians within a reservation, many tribes have sophisticated codes. Some have welltrained professionals on the staffs of water resources departments that do water resources
planning and enforce water rights among those who share in the use of water on the
reservation.

4. Use of Rights for New Purposes
Reserved water rights can be quantified for any purpose for which the federal
government established an Indian reservation. As described earlier, the most commonly
expressed purpose for creating reservations was to enable the Indians to pursue
agriculture, but reserved rights can arise from other purposes. For example, in
historically important fishing and hunting areas reservations were located to provide
access to rivers and lakes to enable the continuation of these traditional lifestyles.
In United States v. Adair (753 D.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), certiorari denied
Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984)), the court found that a treaty provision
guaranteeing the Klamath Tribe the exclusive right to hunt, fish, and gather on its
reservation showed the primary purpose for creating the reservation. Other parts of the
treaty mentioned agriculture; the court found that encouraging the Indians to take up
farming was a second essential purpose of the reservation. Although state law did not
allow water rights for fishing and hunting, the court held that the Indians had such a right
which could be enforced to prevent non-Indians from depleting streams below levels that
were required to maintain streamflows for fish and game.
A more difficult question arises when a tribe wants to use water for purposes
other than those for which its reserved water rights were quantified. For instance, if
rights were quantified for agricultural uses, can a tribe use the water for industrial
purposes, or for a fishery, or even to water a golf course? When the Supreme Court
approved the report of a Special Master and decided the reserved water rights of tribes on
the Colorado River, the Master’s report said that tribes’ use of water was not limited to
the uses that were the basis of quantification. In Arizona v. California (439 U.S. 419
(1979)) in 1979 the Court approved this report.
In the Big Horn adjudication, the court quantified the tribes’ reserved rights based
on irrigable acreage (753 P.2d 76, 98 (Wyo. 1988), affirmed, Wyoming v. United States,
492 U.S. 406 (1989)). The Wind River Tribes decided to use a portion of these rights to
restore streamflows within the reservation and build up the fishery. They recognized an
opportunity to recover the natural ecosystem and to reap economic benefits from tourism
and recreational uses by attracting anglers. Non-Indian water users on the reservation
who would have had to leave water in the stream instead of diverting it for irrigation
objected. The state supreme court rejected the tribes’ attempt to use water for instream
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flows, saying that any change in use would have to be in accordance with Wyoming state
law, which does not recognize such instream uses as “beneficial” (In re General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 835 P.2d 273
(Wyo. 1992)). The United States Supreme Court did not review the decision.
If a tribe changes its water rights to uses that were not the basis for a
quantification of reserved rights and this must be approved under state law, the matter
will be reviewed under the so-called “no injury” rule. This rule applies to all changes in
use under the prior appropriation system. Limiting tribes to one use and prohibiting all
changes would be inconsistent with that system of water rights. When prior appropriators
change their use they must show that no other water users are hurt by the change. If the
no injury rule were applied to Indian reserved water rights it could render them useless.
Recall that tribes generally have not been able to raise the capital needed to put water
rights to use. On the Wind River Reservation, for instance, the federal government
financed an irrigation system that has served mostly non-Indians and the Indians have
made little use of the system. Commencing Indian uses on Wind River and in other river
basins where hundreds of non-Indian water users have built their investments on the use
of water that the tribe, as the senior water rights holder, could have claimed, is bound to
cause injury.
There is no doubt that the equities of established non-Indian water users deserve
consideration. The non-Indian irrigators are neighbors and they are not responsible for
the way the system from which they benefit was developed and for the fact that it has
operated to the detriment of the Indians. The government created the system and the nonIndians inherited the situation. So the non-Indians reasonably expected that the present
conditions would continue. On the other hand, they have been using Indian water to
build their wealth. Under these circumstances, it seems inappropriate to apply the no
injury rule mechanically. This would halt tribal progress and extend even longer the
already long-delayed tribal benefits from use of reserved water rights.
Walker and Williams propose that tribes like those on the Wind River Reservation
exercise their authority to administer and regulate water rights on their reservations and
in doing so take control over the “change of use” question (Walker and Williams 1991).
They can adopt criteria for “sensible water use policies for all reservation citizens” nonIndian as well as Indian (Walker and Williams 1991, 5:10). Some non-Indians have
relied on state permits to use water diverted on the reservation that are over eighty years
old. Walker and Williams urge that tribes “balance the complex interests of these nonIndians against . . . [t]he unique historical circumstances of water development on Indian
reservations [that] may well compel compromise” (Walker and Williams 1991, 5:9).
They say that one such compromise would be for tribes to adopt a public interest standard
for tribal reservation water administration and apply it in a way that considers, along with
other equities, the injury to juniors of changing the use of reserved water rights.
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E. Conclusion
The doctrine of Indian reserved water rights is certainly a potent force for tribes.
Yet its application has not justified the worries of non-Indians. First, only a handful of
tribes – fewer than thirty – have finally determined the extent of their rights. Of those,
only a few have put a significant portion of their water rights to use. Consequently, nonIndians have not been affected adversely by Indian water use. As Richard Collins wrote:
[T]his situation has generated powerful political and financial forces that oppose
Indian development, of which there has been very little. There have been
extravagant claims of the threat posed by Indian water claims, but actual conflict
has been almost entirely a war of words, paper, and lawyers. Indian calls are not
shutting anyone’s headgates (Collins 1985, 56:482).
The doctrine is strong in theory and the challenge to lawyers and tribal leaders is
to give it potency in practice. The fora for doing this are many. The processes for
adjudication or negotiation for determining reserved water rights are expensive and
arduous. They are also uneven in result, depending as they do on the fortuity of how
much political power a particular state’s congressional delegation wields and the timing
relative to the nation’s economic health. Once tribal rights are quantified they will
remain unused because of a shortage of capital, restrictions on marketing, and limits on
changes of use. The tribes must also be able to exercise comprehensive control over the
water when there are non-Indian users within the reservation. Achieving justice and
equity for Indians, then, depends not only on have a generous legal foundation but fair
and reasonable means to use and regulate water resources.
************************************************
4. Critique and Conclusions
Author’s Note: This section will be completed based on reviews by other experts, input
from the panel, and discussion at the conference. Some points that may be covered
include:
o Both environmental interests and Indian tribes have run into the problem of longestablished water rights – system protects the status quo above all.
o Historical allocation rules have changed over the years to reflect broader public
concerns and equities of interests not protected in original allocations.
o States have been inconsistent in their willingness to change laws to reflect these
interests, so the federal government has taken a more active role.
o Looking ahead: Economic and social forces driving water use will encourage
more movement in these directions – water for urban use, recreation, and
environmental protection. Recognizing and protecting public, cultural, and other
“non-traditional” interests will present an increasing challenge to western water
managers.
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